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Abstract 
Joshua Miller: Civic Care: The Value of Disagreements as Care in Plato’s Gorgias  
(Under the direction of Susan Bickford) 
Democratic theorists like Rawls and Habermas identify pervasive disagreements as 
“facts” of pluralistic political life.  Along with other social contract theorists, they propose 
strategies for mitigating or altogether avoiding especially recalcitrant disagreements.  In 
contrast, critical and agonistic theorists like Chantal Mouffe, Iris Marion Young, and Amy 
Gutmann suggest that disagreements are not only pervasive but desirable for democratic 
politics.  These criticisms suffer from their own shortcomings, some of which are addressed 
in this paper.  Specifically, the paper explicates the value of disagreement within a 
democratic context, proposing that a disagreement’s worth should be measured by its 
reasonableness rather than its termination in agreement between adversarial interlocutors.  
Plato’s Gorgias illustrates such worthwhile disagreement.  The dialogue suggests ways for 
interlocutors to approach and sustain disagreement while articulating Socrates’ conception of 
disagreement as a form of civic care.   By sustaining reasoned disagreements, citizens thus 
care for and about democracy and each other.       
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For Kathryn and Moose, as stubborn as they are caring. 
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Introduction 
 August 11, 2009 was a tough day for Arlen Specter but, on the senator’s account, a 
good day for democracy.  Facing a groundswell of public opposition to United States 
healthcare reform, Specter found himself confronted by an agitated citizen who had come to 
voice his complaints at a nationally televised town hall meeting in Lebanon, Pennsylvania.  
After allowing the disruptive gentleman to speak his mind, Specter declared: “We just had a 
demonstration of democracy!”  What did the senator mean by this?  Surely he did not mean 
that democracy was displayed through a dispassionate negotiation of complex legislative 
concerns.  Not only was the exchange between Specter and the citizens gathered that day 
anything but a conversation among experts, it also failed to produce any kind of final 
agreement between the politician and his constituents on how to effectively manage the 
difficult matter before them.  The exchange was rather an emotionally charged disagreement 
between political actors that ultimately failed to resolve itself in a mutually agreeable 
compromise.  If this disagreement was a “demonstration” of democratic politics, what does it 
tell us about democracy more generally?  More specifically, does this exchange imply that 
disagreements carry some intrinsic worth for democracy even when they are unresolved by 
political compromise? 
Disagreements pervade democratic political life.  Societies that encourage self-
actualization and tolerance for pluralistic conceptions of the good life are at once rich with 
cultural diversity and creativity as well as troubled by ethical and logistical hurdles to unified 
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policy formation.  Consequently, many prominent democratic theorists have advanced ways 
to mediate disagreements while preserving the pluralistic character of democratic regimes.  
Such theories include Rawls’ notion of the “overlapping consensus,” Dryzek’s “meta-
consensus,” and the procedural tenants of Habermas’ deliberative rationality.  Because these 
theories tend to address disagreements as problems which must be fixed for democratic 
politics to work, they fail to adequately account for those particularly intractable 
disagreements we encounter daily.  Critics of these consensus-oriented theories—so-called 
“difference democrats”  like Gutmann and Thompson (1996) and “agonistic pluralists” like 
Mouffe (1996, 2007), Honig (1993, 1996), and Young (1996, 1999)—contend that 
differences and disagreements constitute pluralistic society and, indeed, democratic politics.  
Attempts to reconcile those differences between groups through consensus, especially 
according the tenets of Enlightenment rationality, are criticized as elitist and exclusionary 
(Young 1996).  While these theories instructively highlight the discordant nature of 
democratic political life, they nevertheless fail on at least two fronts.  First, they do not locate 
the intrinsic value of disagreements for democracy.  I will argue that disagreements are good 
for their own sake within a democratic context, and will offer account of why this is the case.  
Second, they do not offer a much needed account of better and worse modes of conflict.  
Though agonists like Mouffe suggest that we find ways to transform adversarial competitions 
into agonistic relationships, they fail to illustrate any such practice.  Without some idea of 
what a worthwhile disagreement looks like, it remains difficult to realize the agonistic vision.   
 This essay is an intervention in the debate between consensus theories and their 
agonistic critics.  In what follows, I argue that both consensus theorists and their agonistic 
critics offer instructive but incomplete accounts of how citizens can manage political 
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disagreements.  On the one hand, consensus theorists are correct to emphasize the importance 
of reasoning in democratic politics.  On the other hand, agonistic critics are right to regard 
conflict and disagreement as central ongoing aspects of democratic politics.  Thus reasoning 
is not a practice through which we dissolve conflicts, but rather how we democratically 
engage them.  I propose that democratic theorists need a model of what we might call 
“agonistic reason.” 
 The Socrates of Plato’s Gorgias offers such a model.  My argument will demonstrate 
that Socrates’ practice in the dialogue shows how reasonable disagreements function as a 
kind of civic care for democratic regimes and their citizens.  Thus this project also works to 
expand the feminist literature on the ethics of care in a specifically political direction.  Joan 
Tronto defines care as “a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, 
continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live…That world includes our bodies, our 
selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining 
web” (1995, 142).  This literature instructively highlights multiple dimensions along which 
persons who share the same political space interact with one another.  However, it fails to 
account for the disagreeable tendencies which also accompany such interactions.  
Nonetheless, the language of care also provides a useful framework for how citizens can 
productively channel those tendencies.  The theory of civic care asserts that citizens of 
pluralistic democracies can best sustain their political communities not by suppressing 
dissenting view points, but rather by exchanging them.  That is, more than merely respecting 
or tolerating alternative views—as the familiar language of liberalism might suggest—
citizens should both assert their own views and understand the logic supporting alternatives.  
In this way, citizens “take responsibility for one another,” to use Tronto’s phrase, by assuring 
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that the reasons they provide to support their viewpoints are consistently defensible.1 As 
such, I contend that an ethics of care can fruitfully inform an alternative conception of 
citizens-as-carers of citizenship in a pluralistic democracy.     
The remainder of this paper will proceed in five main sections.  I will begin with a 
more detailed review of the consensus-difference debate.  This section will illustrate the 
problems with consensus-theorists’ emphasis on rational consensus, as well as the 
insufficiency of the extant agonistic critique.  I will then review the literature on 
disagreements in democratic theory, as well as other theories of what constitutes a 
reasonable disagreement.  Here, I will show why democracy needs disagreements, but that 
we need a way to assess better and worse modes of reasonable disagreement.  The third 
section will argue why we should conceive reasonable disagreement as care by linking my 
conception of civic care to the political aspects of care literature.  In the fourth section, I will 
offer a reading of the Gorgias illustrating how care functions within a specifically political 
context, as well as how the Socratic elenchus serves as a model of civic care.  Finally, I will 
explain how my conception of Socratic civic care reorients the consensus-difference debate 
toward a more helpful discussion of how best to encourage modes of reasonable 
disagreement that are most conducive for sustaining democratic politics. 
                                                          
1
  Other theorists have agitated for revisions to democratic theory by underscoring the value of disagreements 
between citizens.  Indeed, John Stuart Mill advocated precisely this kind of civic engagement.  In “On Liberty,” 
Mill asserts that while we have no obligation to prevent others from pursuing deleterious lifeplans according to 
which they alone reap the consequences—say, indulging a debilitating heroin addiction— we nevertheless owe 
it to each other to identify better and worse conceptions of the good, and to encourage each other to stimulate 
our “higher faculties,” even if we must modify conventional etiquette in order to do so (1991, 84-5).  Like the 
aforementioned theorists, however, Mill fails to offer concrete illustrations for how citizens might adopt his 
advice.  He does not address the immediate problem of politeness: why wouldn’t citizens dismiss disagreements 
as mere rudeness?  Thus I look further back in the canon for a viable example of what I call civic care practices.   
 
  
     
       
Consensus and Pluralism 
Contemporary democracies must negotiate varying degrees of pluralism.  Some 
theorists have pointed out that there are many types of pluralism (Lowi 2006, Eisfeld 2006) 
and this range of definitions lends the term a certain conceptual ambiguity.  For the purposes 
of this paper, I will define pluralism as the coexistence of multiple groups—characterized by 
their own conceptions of the good—within a single political community.  As a characteristic 
of contemporary democratic regimes, conditions of pluralism have been at once praised for 
accommodating diverse forms of life and derided for tearing asunder the threads that hold 
political communities together.   
Of the many ways theorists have attempted to negotiate the conflicts that inevitably 
emerge from pluralism (e.g. constitutionalism, elitism, etc.) few have had more resonance 
than the consensus theories championed by Rawls (1971, 1993, 2001), Larmore (1990), 
Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006), and Habermas (1998).  Following Kant and Rousseau, 
consensus theories generally assert that coercive legal institutions are legitimated by the 
broad consent they enjoy from those who are affected by them.  Consensus theories thus 
attempt to outline the conditions under which citizens qua citizens from divergent ethical, 
moral, and political backgrounds can agree on common standards of political legitimacy.  In 
this view, the divergence and competition characteristic of pluralism are problems that must 
find remedy in some level of generalizable, reasonable agreement.   
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In Political Liberalism (1993) Rawls advances a theory of “overlapping consensus” 
within “reasonable” pluralistic political societies.  By remaining neutral with respect to 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines (e.g. religions, philosophies, etc.) and focusing 
specifically on shared political values (e.g. justice), the overlapping consensus is designed to 
reduce the prominence of intractable conflicts of the good life (140).  Rather than attempting 
to moderate conflicts between competing doctrines, the overlapping consensus aims to 
engage citizens of a polity as citizens rather than as members of different groups within 
society.2  As will be discussed below, Rawls’s insistence that different groups can share a 
common political consensus for different reasons differs from the Habermasian conception of 
deliberative consensus.   
There are a few components of Rawls’s overlapping consensus that must be 
addressed here.  First, Rawls envisions the consensus as a way for political societies 
characterized by “reasonable pluralism,” that is, societies that are comprised of “a diversity 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines,” to find common ground (36).  Reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines are those that “are in part the work of free practical reason within 
the framework of free institutions” that govern liberal democratic societies (37).  Reasonable 
pluralism is contrasted with pluralism as such insofar as not every comprehensive doctrine 
(i.e. those that are intolerant, advocate slavery, etc.) is included. In Rawls’s view, reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines must remain amenable to the political aim of justice as fairness, 
which “tries to provide common ground as the focus of an overlapping consensus” (193-4).   
                                                          
2As Rawls explains: “In such a consensus, the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each from 
its own point of view.  Social unity is based on a consensus on the political conception; and stability is possible 
when the doctrines making up the consensus are affirmed by society’s politically active citizens and the 
requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with citizens’ essential interests as formed and encouraged 
by their social arrangements” (134).  
7 
 
 A second important feature of the overlapping consensus is that it is largely the 
product of public reason.  “[In] a democratic society,” Rawls observes, “public reason is the 
reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power 
over one another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution” (214).  Public reason is 
limited to what he calls “constitutional essentials” which include “the fundamental principles 
that specify the general structure of government and the political process” as well as the basic 
rights of citizens, like voting rights, liberty of conscience, and legal protection (227).  Public 
reasoning is also limited to public forums like Congressional debates; private political 
discussions are not subject to its constraints.  However, Rawls is confident that standards of 
public reason will inform the way citizens deliberate even in informal exchanges: “As 
reasonable and rational…[citizens] should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to one 
another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with 
their freedom and equality” (218).  The standard of legitimate reasoning, then, appeals not to 
a comprehensive doctrine to which citizens can expect everyone to adhere3; rather, reasons 
are legitimated by their rational foundations and adherence to common evaluative standards 
of correctness and judgment.    
I would like to stress a final point about Rawls’s notion of the overlapping consensus 
that will be important for my own aims with this project: it is not a modus vivendi.  While 
outlining the steps to reaching an overlapping consensus, Rawls notes that “once a 
constitutional consensus is in place, political groups must enter the public forum of political 
discussion and appeal to other groups who do not share their comprehensive doctrine” (165).  
                                                          
3
 These would be considered “nonpublic reasons” in Rawls’s framework: “[All] ways of reasoning—whether 
individual, associational, or political—must acknowledge certain common elements: the concept of judgment, 
principles of inference, and rules of evidence…otherwise they would not be ways of reasoning but perhaps 
rhetoric or means of persuasion.  We are concerned with reason, not simply with discourse” (220). 
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In so doing, groups cannot simply agree to disagree about the constitutional essentials 
mentioned above.  Rather, the breadth and depth of the consensus is delimited by those issue 
areas of common political—rather than moral—concern that actors can reasonably expect to 
find common ground on through rational discourse.  Though Rawls does not speculate about 
the specific breadth or depth of an overlapping consensus, it is presumably quite general and 
principally concerned with the fundamentals of a given political society. 
 Habermas’ conception of deliberative democratic theory advances another important 
model of consensus that is also premised on the ideal of rational discourse between citizens.  
In Between Facts and Norms (1998) Habermas worries that moral or other norms derived 
from citizens’ comprehensive doctrines will become the subject of bargaining.  Because 
bargaining situations are characterized by compromises and potential winners and losers 
(rather than reasoned argument), the fear is that citizens will become subject to legal rules 
founded on norms with which they deeply disagree.  Consequently, Habermas argues that 
citizens must not only be convinced to approve a rational consensus, but that they must also 
be convinced for the same reasons; that is, according to the same measure of rationality.  He 
draws the distinction between a rationally motivated consensus and a compromise thus: 
“Whereas a rationally motivated consensus rests on reasons that convince all the parties in 
the same way, a compromise can be accepted by the different parties each for its own 
different reasons” (166).  On this view, then, Rawls’s overlapping consensus bears much 
more similarity to the latter than the former.   
Contra Rawls, Habermas limits the legitimacy of a given consensus to its accordance 
with his discourse principle: “Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected 
persons could agree as participants in rational discourse” (107).  Even fair bargaining only 
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indirectly applies this principle because, according to Habermas, actors behave strategically 
in order to advance their private interests; compromises are more the product of effective 
resource management than the exchange of strong, rational arguments (167).  Importantly, 
Habermas acknowledges that bargaining is often a necessary means of negotiating 
disagreements within pluralistic societies (165).  Consequently, his own theory can only be 
“indirectly” brought to bear upon bargaining procedures by urging bargaining practices to be 
more inclusive and rationally motivated (166).  But Habermas neglects to specify a more 
detailed account of what a “fair bargain” might look like.  Moreover, he leaves the question 
of whether or not diverse societies are capable of reaching a consensus very much in 
question.  It seems unlikely, for instance, that a diverse community of political actors can 
come to the same conclusions about stem-cell research policies for the same reasons.  As I 
will discuss at more length in the following section, it is precisely when actors face difficult 
disagreements that they must maintain their commitment to reasoned debate.  They should do 
so not because these disagreements will be resolved through a consensus, but because 
continually engaging one another in a reasoned dialogue about matters of common concern is 
an important step in maintaining a cohesive community in the face of discordant policy 
proposals.4 Citizens owe it to themselves to ensure that the reasons they advance are 
consistent and coherent.  As I will argue, they can achieve this by rigorously examining each 
others’ proposals through reasonable disagreement.    
                                                          
4
 Waldron argues that reasoned dialogue can be embodied in the law: “The claims that law makes…are the 
claims of an existing (and developing) framework ordering our actions and interactions in circumstances in 
which we disagree with one another about how our actions and interactions should be ordered…The authority 
of law rests on the fact that there is a recognizable need for us to act in concert on various issues or to co-
ordinate our behavior in various areas with reference to a common framework, and that this need is not obviated 
by the fact that we disagree among ourselves as to what our common course of action or our common 
framework ought to be” (1999, 7).   
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 Though Rawls and Habermas disagree on the strict definition of consensus, their 
shared ideal of rational discursive exchanges between rational citizens leaves them subject to 
much of the same criticism.  As noted above, radical democrats and advocates of pluralism 
take issue with both theorists’ orientations toward consensus as an ideal remedy for political 
conflict.  For instance, Iris Marion Young’s work on citizenship insists that politics is never a 
settled, and that attempts to render it as such through Enlightenment discourse are mistaken.  
Theories of citizenship that idealize universal inclusion also risk suppressing group and 
individual particularity.  As she explains, this poses problems for both of the consensus 
models outlined above: 
The ideal of the public realm of citizenship as expressing a general will, a point of 
view and interest that citizens have in common which transcends their differences, 
has operated in fact as a demand for homogeneity among citizens.[…] Feminists in 
particular have analyzed how the discourse that links the civic public with fraternity 
is not merely metaphorical.  Founded by men, the modern state and its public realm 
of citizenship paraded as universal values and norms which were derived from 
specifically masculine experience. 2007, 341-2 
Among the examples she lists of the “specifically masculine experience” is the commitment 
to unemotional, rational discourse.  In an earlier work, Young proposes “that we understand 
differences of culture, social perspective, or particularist commitment as resources to draw on 
for reaching understanding in democratic discussion rather than as divisions that must be 
overcome” (1996, 120).  This includes an expanded notion of democratic communication.  
Contra Rawls’s distinction between public and private discourses, Young notes that rhetoric 
and reasoning are complementary.  She provides Plato’s Gorgias as an example: “As the 
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dialogue progresses it becomes clear…that Socrates and his interlocutors cannot sustain such 
a distinction between truth and rhetoric; argument also persuades” (128).   
 Extending her interpretation of Gorgias, Young proposes three elements that should 
be included in democratic communication: greeting, rhetoric, and storytelling.  Her 
discussion of greeting is particularly important for the purposes of this paper.  Against the 
Habermasian commitment to strictly rational discourse, Young points out that discussion is 
“wrapped in nonlinguistic gestures that bring people together warmly, seeing conditions for 
amicability…In this respect bodies, and care for bodies, must enter an ideal of 
communicative democracy” (129).  “Since much democratic discussion will be fraught with 
disagreement,” she continues, “intermittent gestures of flattery, greeting, deference, and 
conciliatory caring keep commitment to the discussion at times of anger and disagreement” 
(130).   
As will be expanded upon in what follows, I largely agree with Young’s insistence 
that democratic communication be expanded beyond strictly rational discourse.  However, I 
differ in my interpretation of how the Gorgias exemplifies this practice.  I will assert that the 
form of disagreement depicted in that dialogue makes a case for disagreement as a form of 
caring; and, further, care can be expanded not only to include the bodies of those who 
participate, but also to the discussion itself.   
In addition to Young’s criticism, Mouffe raises two primary issues with rational 
consensus models.  First, like Young, she observes that rational discourses tend to exclude 
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already marginalized political groups.5 Second, consensus models reify institutions, thereby 
precluding the opportunity for future critique.  Further, Mouffe argues that consensus 
models, specifically those advanced by Rawls and Habermas, fail to understand politics as a 
real-world struggle between competing interests for scarce resources. In favor of an agonistic 
conception of politics, Mouffe posits that the terms of consensus are designed such that, once 
agreed upon, they cannot be criticized or overturned, thereby equating the goal of consensus 
to a dangerous utopia that focuses too much on rational conflict resolution and not enough on 
the radically contingent, non-essentialist nature of democratic pluralism (1996, 250).  The 
procedures that consensus theorists suggest should mediate disagreements actually preclude 
them from taking place on the onset.  She suggests that attempts to formulate a rational 
consensus, “that is, one that would not be based on any form of exclusion” should be 
abandoned because they are not only impossible according to the terms set forth by the 
Habermasian discourse principle, but also that even if these terms were relaxed—as under a 
Rawlsian overlapping consensus—the product would reify sclerotic institutions and insulate 
them from future revision (254).  Instead, Mouffe’s conception of agonistic pluralism 
embraces the contingency of a politics premised on competition between interests.  The goal 
of democratic theory, it follows, should be oriented toward designing institutions that include 
marginalized discourses and mediate potentially oppressive power asymmetries.  
                                                          
5
 Jane Mansbridge (1980) finds that town hall meetings tend to be dominated by white middle-class men who 
may have more practice speaking in public forums.  She additionally observes that minorities—including 
mothers and elderly citizens—tend to have more difficulty getting to such meetings in the first place.  
  
 
 
The Value of Reasonable Disagreements 
My analysis fills in two important gaps in both the consensus and pluralistic 
literatures.  By emphasizing the conditions under which citizens can agree, consensus 
theories neglect the value of disagreements.  Consequently, they fail to account for how 
citizens can best approach one another when they disagree about shared political concerns.  
Pluralists instructively highlight the discordant nature of democratic politics, urging us to 
consider ways to transform antagonistic political relationships into agonistic exchanges.  
However, their account fails on three fronts.  First, they fail to illustrate the specific 
differences between antagonistic and agonistic disagreements.  Second, they do not provide 
an adequate alternative theory of moral disagreement.  Finally, they do not address empirical 
evidence suggesting that increased levels of disagreement actually lead to correspondingly 
high levels of political disengagement.6 Despite these shortcomings, I would like to highlight 
the agonistic claim that disagreements are not only characteristic of, but also intrinsically 
valuable for, democratic politics.  Restricting our political conversations to those with whom 
we share likeminded opinions threatens to create a kind of feed-back loop in which otherwise 
controversial views become entrenched as dogmatic “common-sense” perceptions of how the 
world really is.  Left unchallenged, such opinions not only threaten to undermine citizens’ 
capacities for advancing creative, defensible, reasoned arguments for why they hold the 
                                                          
6
 See Roger Brown, 1986. Social Psychology (2nd ed.) New York: The Free Press. 203-226.   For discussion of 
deliberation exacerbating political cleavages, see Gaus 1997 and Shapiro 1999. 
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views they do but they also a hinder a democratic regime’s ability to make good collective 
decisions.       
Cass Sunstein (2003) addresses this problem of group polarization in his examination 
of social dissent.  He notes that the effects of deliberation-related group polarization are 
particularly problematic for democratic legal systems.7  Following deliberation, jurists tend 
to adopt stronger attitudes toward punishment or leniency than they held prior to trial (113).  
Further, Republican and Democratic judges tend to vote in a more stereotypical fashion when 
they share the bench with like-minded peers (114).  For Sunstein, group polarization is not 
the product of too much disagreement between individuals; rather, it is the product of too 
much agreement within groups that disagree with other groups.  He locates this “group 
think” motivation in two places: information and peer-pressure.  “When people are 
responding to the information conveyed by what others do,” he writes, “we have a distinctive 
kind of conformity” (9).  Likewise, we frequently desire the approval of people with whom 
we identify.  Consequently, Sunstein observes that would-be dissenters within groups tend to 
suppress information that contradicts the ideological assumptions which constitute the group 
in the first place.  This practice frequently produces skewed—potentially wrong—
convictions.  He cites empirical findings which suggest that while persistent conflict between 
group-members who fail to get along can hinder group performance, sufficiently complex 
tasks that demand innovative solutions actually benefit from dissenting views.8  Sunstein 
concludes that well-functioning societies institute practices that promote diversity, “partly to 
protect the rights of dissenters, but mostly to protect interests of their own” (213).  The 
                                                          
7
 For a similar discussion of disagreements and the law, see Waldron 1999. 
 
8
 See Karhen A. Jehn and Elizabeth A. Mannix. 2001. “The Dynamic Nature of Conflict: A Longitudinal Study 
of Intragroup Conflict and Group Performance” Academic Management Journal 44 (2): 238-251. 
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theory of civic care advanced in this paper holds a similar view of the value of disagreement.  
By advancing their views and examining others, democratic citizens preserve both their 
individual voices and the robustness of their shared political community. 
 Sunstein makes a strong case for why promoting free speech is good for democracy.  
However, he offers little in the way of improving the content of that speech.  A viable theory 
of civic care should not only defend the value of disagreements, but also show something of 
what a reasonable disagreement might look like.  As will be argued later in this paper, I 
believe Plato’s Gorgias provides a rich example of civic care as reasonable disagreement in 
practice.  It is nevertheless instructive at this juncture to account for what is meant by 
reasonable disagreement.    
 My theory is informed by a recent body of literature that has articulated an account of 
what constitutes reasonable disagreement (Besson 2005, McMahon 2009).  This literature 
instructively observes that much of what makes disagreement so pervasive and enduring is, 
in fact, its reasonableness.  Following Samantha Besson, I restrict the domain of reasonable 
disagreement to conflicts about shared ethical or moral dilemmas within a political context.  
That is, citizens are principally concerned with the definition, value, and constitutive 
functions of justice within their political community.9  In order to reasonably disagree, 
citizens must also have some standard by which to evaluate evidence.  As Christopher 
McMahon points out, what counts as germane evidence is contingent upon the specific issue 
being discussed (18).  Broadly speaking, however, discussants must be able to mutually 
recognize the validity of evidence presented in favor of, or in opposition to, a proposed 
thesis.  This is because discussants must also be willing to be persuaded by opposing 
                                                          
9
 See also Nagel 1987. 
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arguments.  If discussants are unable to recognize the validity of counterevidence, they are 
unable to meet this criterion.10 Finally, reasonable arguments must be internally consistent.  
Besson notes that standards of reasonableness are typically regarded as less rigorous than 
standards of rationality (93).11 But this should not suggest that reasonable arguments lack 
their own logic.  As my interpretation of the Socratic elenchus makes clear, inconsistent 
beliefs—particularly regarding claims to justice, according to which a discussant would 
presumably will that all members of her political community would adhere—must either be 
rendered consistent or else rejected.  In short, all valid, reasonable arguments must be able to 
withstand immanent critique. 
 A brief example from the 2009 White House Healthcare Summit helps illustrate 
reasonable disagreement.  In an effort to lend transparency—and political theater—to the 
generally opaque process of healthcare reform, the Obama administration convened a 
nationally televised meeting between recalcitrant policymakers in late February.  Different 
forms of evidence were brought to bear during the meeting.  In addition to the empirical 
evidence both Democrats and Republicans brought forth to ground their positions, President 
Obama claimed that he read several letters each day narrating citizens’ healthcare-related 
woes.  These narratives motivated his normative arguments for why expanded healthcare 
coverage was an especially pressing policy concern.  By offering these narrative examples, 
the President attempted to distill a normative dimension of the debate that was not captured 
by statistical projections and other quantitative measures of the impact healthcare reform 
                                                          
10
 Though the theory of civic care values disagreement it does not preclude the possibility of reaching 
agreement, provided such agreement is supported by well-reasoned arguments.  The value of a disagreement is 
not wholly contingent upon an agreeable outcome.  Nevertheless, well-reasoned conclusions are not all treated 
as suspect according to the theory.  Rather, the theory would target those agreements that citizens suspect may 
not be supported by valid reasons.   
 
11
 See also, Rawls 1993, 48; and Scanlon 1998, 22-3 
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would have on the United States.  In other words, both forms of evidence were considered 
equally valid and reasonable.   
This example illustrates another component of reasonable disagreement; namely, 
reasonableness is not measured by resolution in compromise.  In interviews with the press 
following the conclusion of the summit, Obama admitted that Democrats and Republicans 
may not “bridge the gap” between their philosophical differences on the issue.  “Politically 
speaking, there may not be any reason for Republicans to want to do anything,” he 
acknowledged, “But I thought it was worthwhile for us to make this effort.”12 As my 
interpretation of the Gorgias will demonstrate, even disagreements that do not resolve 
themselves in compromise are still politically valuable.  Despite the discussion, the final 
policy did not reflect a “bridge” spanning the ideological divisions between parties.  
Nevertheless, the political spectacle surrounding the debate had its advantages.  Like the 
audience witnessing the exchanges between Socrates and his interlocutors, those who 
watched the summit on television gained accurate insights into both parties’ positions—e.g. 
no Democrat pressed for “death panels”—as well as the reasons supporting them.  These 
insights help frame debates between citizens, thereby elevating the level of public reason 
beyond mere propaganda and sound-bites toward more meaningful engagements.  Finally, 
the exchanges between Republicans and Democrats at the summit exemplify the ongoing 
nature of reasonable disagreements.  Though Obama would not concede to Republican 
demands that reform talks begin anew, he did remark, “[We’ve] got to go ahead and make 
some decisions and then that’s what elections are for,” suggesting that future legislators 
could amend or overturn unpopular policies.  This acknowledgement captures the ongoing 
                                                          
12
 For a complete transcript, see Washington Post, “President Speaks at Healthcare Summit” March 5, 2009.   
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nature of reasonable disagreement insofar as it reflects the unsettled quality of democratic 
decisions.    
  
                 
       
Civic Care in Context 
Theories of care emphasize the specifically human dimension of social labor in 
contemporary societies.  The language of care, highlighting affective connections between 
people—both between citizens as well as between citizens and non-citizens—who share 
social space, provides a useful conceptual vocabulary for the theory of civic engagement 
advanced in this paper.  Though the care literature ranges from feminist political theory to the 
practical dilemmas of the so-called “care industry” (e.g. nursing, counseling, direct social 
services, etc.) for the purposes of this paper I will restrict the following review to concerns 
about the ethics of care and the relationship between care and political theory.  I argue, contra 
much of the literature, that along with concepts like sympathy, commitment, fostering, and 
responsiveness, the language of care can be expanded to include disagreements between 
members of a political community as well.13 
As noted above, theories of care tend to highlight the uniquely human dimensions of 
certain kinds of labor.  For instance Dietmut Grace Bubeck (2002) observes that care is 
“fundamentally other-directed and beneficial to others, while involving an investment of the 
                                                          
13
 My insistence on including conflictual qualities as components of sustaining a political community places my 
theory of civic care at odds with other interpretations of care as an embodied political practice. For instance, 
Maurice Hamington’s (2001) interpretation of Jane Addams as a proponent of embodied care locates her 
conception of care alongside Lugones and Spellman’s emphasis on the language of solidarity, friendship, and 
love.  While I am sympathetic to this argument, I disagree with Addams’ contention that democratic politics is 
contingent upon one’s belief in the “basic goodness of people” (117).  Rather, I highlight the conflictual aspects 
of embodied care to underscore my claim that citizens can care for one another within a political context 
marked by interest-based motivations.  Though this notion of civic care does not preclude conventional 
examples of democratic solidarity such as those found in Addams’ work at the Hull House, it does not depend 
on common affection either.     
20 
 
carer’s time and energy” (160).  Unlike other forms of labor, the work associated with care—
such as nursing the elderly or sick, providing social services the impoverished, or counseling 
to the abused—cannot be alleviated by machines in the way other forms of manual labor can.  
This is principally because the labor associated with care demands emotional and 
psychological effort from the care-worker that cannot be reproduced by machines.  In this 
way, care labor “maintains and reproduces” human communities as associations of 
interdependence (165).  Bubeck conceives of caring as “a mutual giving and taking [between 
the care-giver and receiver]…rewarding in itself, even if it does not generate any material 
returns for the carer” (163, 170).  When defined in terms that highlight everyone’s capacity 
to both give and receive, caring acquires a vital social dimension that resonates with my 
interpretation of Socrates in the Gorgias.  As will be discussed in the next section, Socrates’ 
elenchus is an emotionally and physically demanding procedure which aims to improve his 
interlocutors by insisting that they defend their conceptions of good social life.    
 While Bubeck’s definition of caring as a “mutual exchange” between laborer and 
recipient has been adopted by others (Mackay 2001, Fine 2007), it remains somewhat 
problematic.  Indeed, much of what can make care labor so exhausting is the fact that it can 
demand so much from those who give it while giving so little in return—monetarily or 
otherwise.  Joan Tronto (2005) seizes on this point.  Observing that much of the care work in 
the United States is provided by illegal immigrants who are not protected under existing 
labor laws, Tronto argues that citizenship should be extended to workers on the basis of the 
services they provide.  An obvious shortcoming of this proposal is that, should care-workers 
lose their jobs, their citizenship rights could also be revoked.  Nevertheless, the connection 
between care and citizenship is an important one for this paper.  By underscoring the unique 
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contributions that care-workers provide to sustaining their communities, Tronto politicizes 
care-work beyond its economic dimensions and invites us to consider how caring can be 
understood as a political activity.  Indeed, as will be shown shortly, this is precisely how 
Socrates characterizes care in the Gorgias. 
The theory of civic care is not so much a critique of the extant care literature as it is 
an extension of it.  Caring for each other does not mean citizens have to agree.  As my 
interpretation of the Gorgias will demonstrate, sustained political debate is a political good in 
itself for a democratic polity.  Finally, I must stress that the model of civic care is focused on 
citizens’ interactions as citizens.  Sustaining even the most dispassionate disagreements may 
not be productive for other dimensions of human life.  Constantly arguing with our parents or 
siblings may, indeed, prove harmful for family life.  In that context, a modus vivendi may be 
more appropriate.  But this is not so for democratic politics, where interests are represented 
and compete with others for scarce political capital.  If democratic institutions promote 
inclusion and public reason, they are also bound to promote the discordant exchange of 
reasons for why a polity should embrace some policies while rejecting others.  In this 
context, citizens must take other viewpoints seriously, which entails subjecting them to 
critique.  Moreover, according to the criteria of reasonable disagreement outlined in the 
preceding section, citizens must be willing to persuade and be persuaded by these alternative 
views.  In this way, citizens commit themselves to caring for sustainable debate and, in turn, 
the democratic culture they support.        
  
     
 
Civic Care in Plato’s Gorgias 
I have argued throughout this paper that disagreements can function as civic care in 
democratic polities.  In this section, I will present a reading of Plato’s Gorgias that illustrates 
how this model can function in practice as Socratic elenchus.  In what follows, I will 
demonstrate how my reading of Plato’s Socrates in this dialogue serves as an instructive 
archetype of democratic citizenship.  My interpretation of Socrates in the Gorgias differs 
from some theories of so-called “Socratic citizenship.”  Unlike some accounts, I argue that 
Socratic elenchus functions on two levels.  First, following a somewhat conventional 
interpretation of Socrates’ project, I posit that the elenchus problematizes the received 
wisdom and deeply held but otherwise unquestioned beliefs of Socrates’ interlocutors.  I will 
argue that such beliefs threaten democracy by asserting an elitist privilege of private 
knowledge that fails to adequately engage most citizens in the independent analytical thought 
required of healthy democratic citizenship.  By strongly encouraging interlocutors to question 
their prior beliefs, Socrates performs the activity of civic care as defined in the previous 
section of this paper.  Second, I argue that Socrates maintains an often overlooked positive 
conception of justice (dikē) in the Gorgias as a harmony of soul effected through disciplined 
reasoning.  As Gregory Vlastos (1994) also asserts—revising his earlier thinking about 
Socratic elenchus—Socrates is committed to the notion that his interlocutors maintain both 
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good and false beliefs about justice; elenctic arguments will highlight the inconsistency of 
false beliefs, thereby distilling the good.14    
This is not to suggest that Socrates’ conception of justice is the final word on the 
subject in the Gorgias—though it of course is within the dialogue itself.  Despite the 
dialogue’s arguable “failure” as a demonstration of pure political philosophizing, I argue that 
Socrates’ method gestures toward the need for us to continually revisit our most settled 
beliefs.  As many critics have emphasized, Socrates’ philosophical wisdom is defined not by 
its product but by the collaborative, other-oriented process that generates it.  Still, he does 
advance a positive conception of the good life, even if his interlocutors are not convinced by 
it. I argue that the instructive qualities of Socratic dialogue—much like intractable arguments 
in contemporary political life—are best judged not according to the degree of consensus it 
generates between the philosopher and his interlocutors, but rather by his commitment to 
engage others in difficult discussions about what is important for the good life.  Moreover, 
because Socrates equips his interlocutors with a method through which they can consider and 
critique their own views as well as his, the overall dialogue can be read as settling upon a 
reasonably pluralistic conception of what the good life is.  In short, Socrates’ elenchus cares 
for citizens by engaging them in difficult discussions that, while not always persuasive, 
nevertheless discipline their souls through reason.  This is good for the city insofar as citizens 
who are better equipped to offer and understand reasoned arguments are better able to govern 
themselves.  Socrates’ genuine political technē within a democratic context, then, equates 
leadership with care. 
                                                          
14
 Sung-Woo Park grounds a similar argument in Platonic epistemology.  
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My discussion will proceed as follows.  I begin with a summary of the Gorgias, 
highlighting thematic elements that are important for the theory of civic care.  Next, I 
consider alternative accounts of “Socratic citizenship” and demonstrate how my 
interpretation of Socrates differs from these accounts.  Third, I defend the view that the 
Socrates of the Gorgias can be understood as a democrat.  My defense is informed by several 
other prominent yet controversial arguments for a democratic Socrates.  However, many of 
these arguments rely upon an interpretive assumption that explains anti-democratic qualities 
by either contextualizing the Gorgias within the Platonic corpus (e.g. Kahn’s argument that it 
falls between the Apology and the Republic) or emphasizing structural consideration of the 
dialogue as a democratic form of political engagement (e.g. Euben’s structural 
interpretation).  My interpretation maintains that a case can be made for a democratic 
Socrates that is wholly contained within the substance of the Gorgias.  Forth, I consider how 
the Socratic elenchus operates as a democratic form of civic care.  Finally, I address potential 
challenges to this series of arguments. 
 
  
The Philosopher and the Orators in the Gorgias 
Over the course of the Gorgias, Socrates engages three increasingly intractable 
interlocutors—Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles—in a discussion about the differences between 
oratory and philosophy, as well as the merits of actualizing the good life according to the 
standards of justice rather than personal profit.  He first encounters Gorgias, a prominent 
orator, sophist and teacher of rhetoric.  The dialogue opens with Callicles’ invitation to 
Socrates and his companion, Chaerephon, to join with a gathering of men at his home for a 
“presentation” of Gorgias’s oratorical skill (447b).  To this, Socrates asks, “Would he be 
willing to have a discussion with us?” (447c), suggesting an early contrast between the two 
analytical methods.   As will be discussed below, the presence of an attentive audience which 
bears witness to both the rhetorical presentation and the philosophical discussions follow is 
an important but often overlooked component of the dialogue.   
Callicles responds to Socrates that Gorgias would likely submit to the philosopher’s 
questions, noting that “he invited [his audience] to ask him any question they liked, and he 
said that he’d answer them all” (447c).  Here, Gorgias’s didactic position with respect to his 
audience—and the authority he commands within the city—is dependent upon his command 
of private knowledge.  That is, Gorgias claims to possess knowledge of certain subjects 
which becomes accessible to others in the crowd only through him.  There are two important 
points to highlight about the opening exchanges.  First, Gorgias boasts to Chaerephon that 
“no one has asked [him] anything new in many a year” (448a).  From this claim we 
understood not only that Gorgias commands a good deal of oratorical experience, but also 
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that no innovative questioner has seriously challenged his practice.15  His confidence 
underscores the fact that he is demonstrating his oratorical talents before a gathering of 
would-be (paying) pupils, who should presumably want to learn from a tried-and-true master.  
Gorgias apparently measures his system’s success by its ability to satisfactorily answer 
questions.  Second, the Gorgianic model positions the questioner and respondent in 
asymmetric roles: the questioner asks for information from the respondent, who supplies the 
information to a passive questioner.  Gorgianic enquiry is not a joint venture between 
questioner and respondent; the respondent is posited as the sole locus of knowledge.  In order 
for the practice of civic care to be viable, Socrates’ elenchus must first displace this 
Gorgianic model of enquiry.  As I will argue in more detail below, he does so by appealing to 
the audience’s evolving capacity to judge the relative merits of his elenchus against his 
interlocutors’ oratorical method of inquiry.    
Gorgias’ main claim to the power of oratory is staked in its ability to persuade people, 
especially large groups.  A command of oratory would serve one well when attempting to 
convict another before the Athenian Assembly (454e).  His claim that oratory gives 
individuals control over their city and freedom from rule (452d) underscores its 
antidemocratic aspirations.  Tellingly, he offers an example of persuading a patient to submit 
to a physician’s medical care.  Though Gorgias does not have any medical training himself, 
he insists that he is better equipped to offer persuasive medical advice to a group of non-
experts than the physicians themselves (456b-457c).  Gorgias here presents himself as a 
potentially false physician.  This is important because, as we will see, Socrates deploys 
                                                          
15
 Polus, a disciple of Gorgias, also connects experience to craft, telling Chaerephon that “it is experience that 
causes our times to march along the way of craft, whereas inexperience causes it to march along the way of 
chance” (448c).   
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medical analogies throughout the dialogue to explain how politics is a difficult, rigorous, and 
often unpleasant but nevertheless constructive sphere of activity—much like unpalatable 
medicine that heals patients.  Indeed, Socrates criticizes oratory for failing to inculcate 
citizens with any genuine knowledge and for taking advantage of peoples’ ignorance as it 
persuades them to adopt one position or another through flattery without actually teaching 
them anything (459b, 463b).  That is, oratory does not improve citizens’ souls through 
education—much as a physical trainer would improve their bodies through training—but 
rather pacifies them through sweet words—much as a pastry chef would please children with 
treats (465b).   
The disagreement between the two, then, stems from Gorgias’s conviction that 
teaching his pupils how to persuade members of the Assembly is a profitable skill, whereas 
Socrates considers it a dubious and potentially dangerous vehicle for injustice (461a-b).  This 
in turn reveals the deeper philosophical disagreement about whether seeking profit—defined 
monetarily or otherwise—or justice is a better way to orient one’s life.  Though Gorgias 
apparently considers oratory a neutral practice (technē), his insistence that it is “concerned 
with those matters that are just and unjust” (454b) as well as “just about everything else that 
can be accomplished” (456b) adds an ethical dimension to the substance of the disagreement 
between himself and the philosopher.         
Socrates politely insists that Gorgias discuss these matters with him through “an 
orderly discussion” by way of dialectical questioning and answering (454c).  Throughout the 
dialogue, the difference between Gorgias’ oratorical approach to “answering” questions and 
Socrates’ use of questions in the dialectic is cast into relief.  While the former is willing to 
allow for participation from others only to the extent that they can propose topics upon which 
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the expert will expound, the latter emphasizes a form of discussion that demands much more 
input from both questioner and respondent.  Unlike oratory, the viability of a Socratic 
discussion is contingent upon an active, intimate engagement between questioner and 
respondent.  As Michael Frede observes: “Obviously, the questioner has a decisive influence 
on the course of the argument; for he asks the questions the answers to which will form the 
premises.  But equally obviously it is the respondent who gives the answers” (1992, 205).  
This is borne out in Socrates’ willingness to assume both questioner and respondent roles in 
his exchange with Polus (462a-d).     
By contrasting discussion to oratory in his early exchange with Gorgias, Socrates 
establishes the form his dialogues will attempt to assume.  Socrates’ second exchange with 
Polus highlights his preference for brevity and consistent, genuine responses from his 
interlocutors.  These demands underscore the notion that Socrates’ philosophical discourse 
focuses more on seeking reasonably defensible claims than on simply winning an argument 
(449a-b), by maintaining both participants’ willingness to be refuted (458a).  Just before 
Polus enters the discussion, Socrates has apparently shamed Gorgias for his inability to 
account for a purely just form of oratory (461a-b).  Polus concedes that Socrates has revealed 
the inconsistencies of the master orator’s argument with respect to justice and oratory (461b), 
and seeks to restore oratory as an amoral technē that insulates tyrannical leaders from 
accountability and gives them control over their cities.  In order to do so, he must show that 
one’s happiness and the means by which one thinks one has achieved it are mutually 
exclusive.  His attempt to do so reveals a crucial distinction between how oratory and 
philosophy regard the happy life.  For the orator, happiness is a settled state—an end—which 
one can achieve through unjust, unhappy means.  For the philosopher, the end of happiness 
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and the means by which one pursues it are one in the same.  That is, the happy life consists in 
pursuing happiness.  As such, for Socrates no technē is morally neutral; rather, the means 
define the end to which they are pursuant.   
Polus posits Archelaus, a despotic Persian king, as a viable model of happiness.  For 
Polus, though Archelaus is an unjust and illegitimate ruler, his omnipotence nevertheless 
makes him happy (471a-d).  Moreover, he insists that the audience—indeed, all of 
humanity—agrees with his argument that the means and ends of one’s happiness are 
mutually exclusive (473e).  Socrates’ exchange with Gorgias highlighted the structural and 
substantive differences between philosophy and oratory; the exchange between Socrates and 
Polus extends this distinction by casting the substantive conflict between justice and 
advantage into relief.  In order to disrupt Polus’ view of happiness, Socrates must illustrate 
the connection between the process by which an actor attains political influence and the 
happy ends to which one aspires. 
 Socrates insists that tyrants are never happy because they do not exercise genuine 
power.  If “having power” means commanding “something that’s good for the one who has 
it” (466b), a tyrant who attains political power through unjust practices never commands 
genuine power because acting unjustly is never good.  For the philosopher, justice and 
education are the two ingredients to a happy life (eudaimonia) (470e).  Contra Polus, he 
maintains that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it (470c, 475c), and that suffering 
just punishment is better than escaping it (476e-477b).  Conforming to these two demands 
prevents corruption of the soul and, accordingly, happiness (478d-e).  This description places 
Socrates and Polus in direct substantive contradiction.  Furthermore, Socrates’ definitions of 
justice and the happy life stand in direct contradiction with everyone in the audience.  Indeed, 
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as Sung Woo Park instructively points out, few agreements were more widely shared among 
Athenians than a definition of justice as “privileging one’s friends and harming one’s 
enemies” (2002, 120).  As noted above, Polus underscores this point by evoking the 
audience’s authority: “Don’t you think you’ve been refuted already Socrates, when you’re 
saying things the likes of which no human being would maintain?  Just ask any one of these 
people” (473e).  By attacking Polus, then, Socrates is also attacking the received, possibly 
dogmatic, wisdom of Athenian political life.  If a political community is largely constituted 
through shared conceptions of justice and what constitutes a happy life, Socrates’ elenchus 
threatens to upend the entire Athenian way of life.  In this way, though Socrates claims that 
he is unable to perform an elenchus on a large gathering of people, insisting that he 
“disregards” and does not “even discuss things with the majority” (474a), we see him 
engaging broader Athenian political life.16   
Socrates initially defines the goal of the Gorgias dialogue in terms of distilling the 
essence of oratory.  This is important to note with respect to how one might gauge the 
success of a discussion versus an oratorical presentation.  Whereas the latter emphasizes 
persuasion, the former is better judged by how faithfully the participants follow the line of 
reasonable inquiry.  Again, Socrates’ main criticism of oratory is that it seeks to persuade an 
un-knowing audience through flattery and deception (463a-466a).  By contrast, his 
discussions apparently seek genuine knowledge, hard-wrought and painful as it may be to get 
at, rather than to elevate his social status among the majority.  This is borne out when 
Socrates seems to have “won” the argument against his final interlocutor, Callicles, toward 
                                                          
16
 Socrates’ claims that he disregards the majority might be interpreted by some as indications that he is 
opposed to democracy.  However, if I am correct in asserting that he can engage a larger audience by publically 
performing his elenchus, it follows that the comparatively democratic dialectical argumentative format can be 
extended to the larger Athenian community. 
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the conclusion of the text.  “But it’s not for love of winning that I’m asking you,” Socrates 
insists, “It’s rather because I really do want to know the way…in which you suppose the 
city’s business ought to be conducted among us” (515b).  Socrates is not simply being 
humble here.  A successful piece of oration “wins” when it convinces others, thereby 
precluding further debate.  A successful elenctic dialogue, however, does not conclude with 
conviction or stop with one’s interlocutor’s puzzlement; but is further sustained through re-
examination of the subject.  For instance, when Callicles remains unconvinced by, but unable 
to refute, Socrates—when Socrates presumably “wins”—the philosopher insists that “if we 
closely examine these same matters often and in a better way, you’ll be convinced” (513d).  
In other words, if the procedure is conducted often and thoroughly enough, it will eventually 
succeed in yielding some kind of knowledge.  Importantly, however, it will not generate a 
consensus.  Since none of Socrates’ early dialogues seem to succeed in this respect, this 
suggests that the process should continue indefinitely.  Furthermore, it suggests that whatever 
knowledge elenctic engagement will yield is not settled in the sense that it is open to constant 
re-examination.     
Callicles is Socrates’ most difficult interlocutor in the text.  In many respects, the two 
are the most equally matched discussants.  The equality between the philosopher and sophist 
is underscored by strategic parallels in their accounts of motivation.  Whereas Socrates 
asserts that the good life is actualized by abstaining from injustice, Callicles argues that the 
good life is one which maximizes pleasure and power.  Despite Socrates’ claims that he is 
motivated exclusively by his pursuit of truth, Callicles accuses Socrates of in fact being 
motivated by the pleasure he derives from “crowd pleasing vulgarities” like humiliating his 
interlocutors (482e).  Interestingly, Socrates maintains that the only pleasures worth pursuing 
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are those which are good because they orient us toward the good according to justice.  As 
such, he must attempt to persuade his interlocutors that they commit themselves to pursuing 
justice, for pursuing justice is the only way to attain the good by definition.17  
Some interpret the Gorgias as a limited, ultimately failed defense of philosophy 
because Socrates fails to win Callicles’ unqualified ascent (Kahn 1996, Beversluis 2000).18  
Responding to Socrates’ argument that the life of unrestrained pleasures is less than 
satisfactory, Callicles replies: “I don’t know how it is that I think you’re right, Socrates, but 
the thing that happens to most people has happened to me: I’m not really convinced by you,” 
to which Socrates concedes, “It’s your love for the people, Callicles, existing in your soul, 
that stands against me” (513c).  I will discuss the implications of Callicles’ love of the demos 
shortly.  For now, I would like to illustrate why Socrates’ exchange with Callicles is 
particularly important for understanding my theory of civic care. 
In his discussion with Callicles, Socrates explicitly equates leadership with care, 
highlighting the parallels between care, leadership, and citizenship.  He begins by asking: 
“Shouldn’t we then attempt to care for the city and its citizens with the aim of making the 
citizens themselves as good as possible?” (513e).  For him, we have an obligation to care for 
the souls of those who will rule the city because there is no point to anything else if this 
group is corrupt (514a).  Good citizens care for the city by doing good things for it much the 
same as a doctor would his patient, that is, by “redirecting [the city’s] appetites and not 
giving in to them, using persuasion or constraint to get the citizens to  become better…That 
                                                          
17
 Kahn argues that “shame” functions throughout the text to highlight this point—the orators’ shame in 
declaring that all pleasures are equally good is unsustainable.    
 
18
 Indeed, this interpretation leads Kahn to believe that Plato wrote the Republic in order to fulfill the Gorgias’s 
objective (1996, 144). 
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alone is the task of a good citizen” (517b-c).  However, when leaders behave irresponsibly, 
they corrode the people’s souls, much as a baker would “fill and fatten [their] bodies…and 
besides that, destroy their original flesh as well, all the while receiving their praise!” (518c). 
Here, Socrates controversially attacks the archetypically democratic leader Pericles, asserting 
that he made the city gluttonous and thus unable to bear up to adversity (519a).  According to 
Socrates, early leaders like Pericles left the city “swollen and festering…For they filled the 
city with harbors and dockyards, walls, and tribute payments and such trash as that, but did 
so without justice and self control” (519a).  Consequently, when later leaders find themselves 
surrounded by “sickness,” they resort to unjust coercion, all the while complaining of the 
injustice that pervades the city.  “But that’s completely false,” Socrates concludes, “Not a 
single city leader could ever be brought to ruin by the very city he’s the leader of” (519c).  
Had they been truly good political leaders, they would have improved the people by 
persuading them to aim at justice; accusing them of injustice is admitting to neglect.19  But if 
one effectively cares for the city in the sense of making others good, one would have no fear 
of suffering injustice oneself (519c-d, 520d). 
Socrates’ attack on Pericles may strike readers—as well as his interlocutors—as 
excessive.  Surely, one might think, Socrates does not really mean to suggest that Athens’ 
democratically supported leadership rendered the city swollen and festering.  On my 
interpretation, the philosopher’s hyperbolic speech is strategically designed to provoke 
                                                          
19
 This claim underscores Socrates’ definition of politics as an activity that aims toward justice.  For him, 
injustice is a symptom of inconsistent belief.  Accordingly, political technē is the reconciliation of consistent 
belief through elenchus; hence Socrates’ claim that he is “one of a few Athenians…to take up the true political 
craft and practice the true politics…because the speeches [he makes] on each occasion do not aim at 
gratification but at what’s best” (521d).     
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Callicles and the rest of his audience.20  Socrates deploys this tactic throughout the dialogue.  
During his earlier exchange with Polus, he argues that a good citizen should not merely 
accept just punishments, but should further “be his own chief accuser, and the accuser of 
other members of his family” (480d).  Like Polus, readers might consider such arguments 
absurd.  But before dismissing these statements, Socrates’ interlocutors are compelled to 
articulate why they find them so incredible.  That is, they must examine their own 
assumptions and weigh their arguments against the philosopher’s statements.  In so doing, 
they are further engaged in the elenchus.      
This account illustrates three aspects of civic care.  First, civic care is a self-interested 
practice insofar as one benefits oneself by improving the political community one inhabits.  
When citizens engage one another in the mode of political care Socrates describes to 
Callicles—as well as the onlooking audience—they foster just communities.  Such 
communities are more likely to question arbitrary political violence and poor decisions, 
thereby guarding against them.  As such, it is in every citizen’s self interest to engage each 
other and their leaders in debate, thereby caring for the city.  Second, the political technē of 
civic care is one that all citizens of a democratic regime have a potential—indeed, an 
obligation—to practice.  According to my interpretation, if “redirecting appetites” rather than 
indulging them and “using persuasion” and reasonable debate to constrain the city are the 
tasks of a good citizen, it follows that all citizens have a role in engaging in civic care.  
Citizens who simply allow their city to make poor decisions or stand idly by as others suffer 
arbitrary injustice are as complicit in their city’s decay as their leadership.  In other words, 
civic care is not only a task for political leadership but also a task of political membership.   
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 Euben similarly suggests, “Suppose the point is to stimulate argument and debate, to have Athenians become 
more thoughtful about what they had done and could do in the future” (1997, 205). 
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Socrates’ exchange with Callicles illustrates a third aspect of civic care.  His 
commitment to persuading Callicles suggests, contra a purely negative view of the Socratic 
project, that the philosopher is convinced that his positive conception of the good life is one 
worth pursuing.  That is, the Socratic project is not simply one that is characterized by the 
dialectical form of the dialogue, but also by his insistence that the just life is one that is worth 
convincing people to adopt.  
  
 
 
Socratic Citizenship 
 As noted earlier, I am not the first to posit Socrates as a model of citizenship.  Dana 
Villa’s advances an interpretation of Socrates as a philosopher-citizen whose primary public 
activity is to engage others through a kind of “dissolvent rationality,” the aim of which 
“seems to have been that the resulting perplexity would slow his fellow citizens down in their 
performance of injustice, which is almost always wrapped in the cloak of ‘virtue’” (2).  
Contra his interpretation of Vlastos, Villa argues that Socrates’ most important public 
contributions to democracy should not be judged according to how rational he was, but rather 
by the extent to which he challenges others’ beliefs through a strictly negative rationality21.  
On Villa’s account, Socrates is devoted to a deconstructive project: “Elenchus reveals the 
confident claims of the ‘moral experts’ as so many baseless illusions, but without offering the 
comfort of an alternative set of ‘moral facts’” (17).  Following Arendt, Villa asserts that 
“[questioning] is an end in itself” that does not require expert knowledge to do effectively 
(20, 26).  Indeed, Villa lauds Socrates as a model of democratic citizenship precisely 
because, on his view, the philosopher was willing to engage anyone in dialogue regardless of 
social class or assertion of privileged knowledge. 
 Villa argues that the most surprising feature of the Gorgias is not its defense of the 
philosophical life as one devoted to the arête of soul-craft, but rather its central claim that 
committing an injustice is the worst thing one can do.  Indeed, as I noted earlier, this is 
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 Vlastos seeks to reconcile inconsistencies in Socrates’ elenchus to show that the philosopher’s dialogues do 
contain defensible positive assertions 
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Socrates’ main positive assertion against Callicles.  Because Callicles does not view the 
philosophical life as sufficiently active, Socrates must demonstrate not only the predilection 
for injustice that often accompanies the “active life” in an imperial democracy but further 
that Callicles’ is not a tenable alternative.  In this respect, “[the] Gorgias represents the 
relentless picking apart of that contradiction [a democratic empire] and the statesman 
(Pericles) who tried to conceal it” (Villa 34).  The Calliclian “active life” militates against 
thoughtful action and is thus more prone to injustice.  Villa views Socrates as dedicated to 
curing Athens of injustice not by asserting an alternative view of justice himself, but by 
complicating its decision-making processes and inducing perplexed hesitation.  In this 
respect, Socrates is cast as a kind of proto-Derridean, asserting that any positive action will 
necessarily commit an injustice against someone, and so the best action is no action at all.22  
 Villa’s interpretation of Socrates as a frustrating figure in Athenian public affairs is 
no doubt accurate in many respects.  However, his emphasis on the “dissolvent rationality” of 
Socratic elenchus neglects an important feature of Socratic citizenship, namely, that he 
maintains an implicit standard by which to judge the justice—or lack thereof—of particular 
actions.  Though Socrates may not be as didactic as his oratory interlocutors, he nevertheless 
advances a positive assertion that privileges the disciplined, ordered life oriented by logos 
over the amoral, corporeally pleasurable Calliclean alternative.  As Susan Bickford argues, 
“Socrates’ characteristic activity was to insist that there is a good that is worth pursuing—
that ethical norms are not simply cynical artifice or cloaks for power—for he was also 
                                                          
22
 Derrida (2006) contends that all norms remove individuals from responsibility toward one another because 
they shift the locus of authority from the individual to society.  On his account, any positive assertion—no 
matter its claims to democratic inclusion—is necessarily exclusionary, rendering actors “infinitely 
overwhelmed…by a responsibility that cannot but be infinite—and impossible to assume” (113).  As such, his 
notion of democracy-to-come assumes a deeply negative view of politics, wherein the only way to avoid 
committing injustice is to avoid any positive action at all.     
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arguing against the sophistic claim that nothing is true” (2009, 127).  Villa’s interpretation of 
Socrates in the Gorgias overlooks this point as a central motivation for the philosopher’s 
claim that he is among the few Athenians to actually practice “the true political craft” (521d).  
Socrates does not characterize the political arête of asking questions as “constantly 
challenging decisions for the sake of making politicians think about their actions,” but rather 
as crucial steps in aiming “at what’s best” (521d-e).  
My own notion of Socratic citizenship builds more upon Socrates’ parallels between 
physical training and political education throughout the Gorgias.  Like physical training, 
Socrates’ pedagogy is challenging and painful.  Contra Villa, I maintain that Socrates’ 
elenchus does include a positive argument: justice is preferable to injustice and happiness is 
achieved through justice rather than injustice.  Because his notion of happiness is often 
counter-intuitive, however, Socrates’ elenchus must first compel his interlocutors to unlearn 
what they think they know by demonstrating the logical inconsistency of their own beliefs.  
As Gary Alan Scott insightfully observes: “Little wonder then that being questioned by the 
philosopher-diagnostician would have felt to some characters like being forcibly disrobed for 
examination by a trainer” (2000, 41).23  Considered as such, Socratic rationality does more 
than merely dissolve dogmatic belief when it brings characters to moments of aporia.  More, 
it clears space in which they can begin to reconstruct consistent moral beliefs.  By reasonably 
disagreeing with one another, then, Socratic citizens are engaged in collaborative elenchoi, 
the aim of which is consistent moral belief.  Though such citizens may not fully reconcile 
                                                          
23
 Scott’s comment also speaks to the laborious quality of care.  Training is difficult work, and the trainee is not 
always cooperative or even appreciative.  Committing to caring for others is committing to struggle with them 
through a constructive—albeit unpleasant—process.    
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their differences, engaging with one another in this way is nevertheless a valuable practice 
insofar as it encourages the kinds of reasonable discussions that are good for democracy.    
Finally, my interpretation of Socratic citizenship, in keeping with the theory of civic 
care, highlights the affective strategies Socrates deploys when engaging his interlocutors.  I 
share Young’s focus on an interpretation of Socrates as a model of human interaction 
between citizens.  Throughout the Gorgias, Socrates’ interlocutors exhibit a range of 
emotion, from respect (i.e. Gorgias) to aggression (i.e. Polus) to frustrated exasperation (i.e. 
Callicles).  But Socrates is also shown to exhibit a corresponding range of emotional 
responses throughout the dialogue.  If Socrates is to work as a model of citizenship and the 
embodiment of civic care, these affective qualities are important for at least two reasons.  
First, as noted in my discussion of extant theories of care, civic care is an embodied practice 
in which humans engage one another.  Human interaction—particularly when it is 
contentious—is fraught with emotion.  Taking disagreements seriously means taking 
counter-arguments as well as the emotions they incite seriously in turn.  Second, as my 
discussion of reasonable disagreements made clear, emotional appeals can be persuasive.  On 
the one hand, this means that citizens engaging one another in civic care must be attuned to 
the differences between genuinely reasonable arguments and disingenuous emotional 
coercion.  On the other hand, citizens should also be aware that they are deal with one 
another as emotional beings who share a community.  As such, negotiating these tensions 
through different affective strategies may prove vital for sustaining difficult—and 
exhausting—debates.  Socrates’ emotional flexibility as illustrated in the Gorgias offers an 
example of how this can be achieved, as he entices his interlocutors to continue the 
discussion.    
  
    
 
Defending a Democratic Socrates in the Gorgias 
 Critics have often pointed out that while the Socrates of the Apology resonates with 
democratic sympathizers, the character is more difficult to defend in the Gorgias.  Prima 
facie, Socrates’ claims that he is unable to communicate with large groups (521e-522e, 472a-
d, 474a-b), his apparent disregard for the intelligence of the masses (463a-c), and his claims 
to characterize politics as a craft, of which he is one among only a few who correctly practice 
it (521d) all weigh against him as a champion of democracy.  Moreover, his frequent 
characterization of leadership as a technē of “soul-craft” (521d) suggests an undertone of 
manipulation or, in Peter Euben’s parlance, “psychic engineering” in proper political 
leadership.  Consequently, even critics who want to defend the view that Socrates is a 
sympathetic—if critical—friend to democracy frequently look outside the actual textual 
evidence of Gorgias to defend their positions.  For instance, Euben (1997) contends that 
while the substance of the text paints Socrates as at best an elitist—and at worst a tyrant—the 
structure of the dialogue as such works to engage the reader in the discussion itself.  To this 
end, the dialogue is instructive for democrats insofar as it challenges us to defend our views 
as yet another host of interlocutors.  In a sense, the dialogue generates its own audience, 
which it then engages in the same dialectical exercise as the characters themselves. 
 Charles Kahn also argues in favor of a democratic Socrates in the Gorgias, but insists 
that we must read the dialogue within the proper context of the Platonic corpus.  He argues 
that the Gorgias “lies on a direct line of moral concern that leads from the Apology and Crito 
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to the Republic, a concern with the defense of Socratic morality in the face of a radical 
challenge from the spokesmen for moral cynicism and Realpolitik” like Thrasymachus and 
Callicles (1996, 127).  If the Crito presents a justification for the integrity of the moral life—
that is, a moral life conducive to democratic politics—the Gorgias tests that conception of 
the good life by putting it in conversation with hostile objectors (126).  But because the 
Gorgias fails to unequivocally persuade its most recalcitrant objector, Callicles, Plato must 
have written the Republic in order to establish a more complete “moral psychology…a 
psychological theory that can give rational support to the intuitive conviction that justice is 
the health of the soul, so that someone with a character like Socrates must be not only 
virtuous but happy” (144).  In short, Kahn traces a conceptual trajectory between the Socrates 
of the Apology to the Socrates of the Republic by way of the Gorgias to demonstrate that the 
same democratic ethos runs throughout the early Platonic dialogues, which are presumably 
focused more on the historic Socrates than a vehicle for Plato’s own political thought. 
 I do not take issue with either Euben or Kahn on their respective arguments; however, 
I differ from them to the extent that, on my reading of the Gorgias, a defensible argument for 
a democratic Socrates can be made that is wholly contained within the substance and 
structure of the text.  Indeed, there are several textual elements that incorporate both of these 
views.  First, as I noted in my summary of the dialogue, the discussions between Socrates 
and his interlocutors have an audience.  Indeed, all of the early Platonic dialogues of which 
Kahn writes have audiences.  The audience of the Gorgias is described as asking questions of 
Gorgias during his public “presentation” (epideiknusthai) at the opening of the text.  
Importantly, it is because Socrates and Chaerephon have joined this audience that they are 
invited by Callicles to ask questions of Gorgias themselves (447c) and it is the audience that 
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motivates the discussion to continue (458b-e).24  Socrates even positions himself as a 
representative of the audience early in his discussion with the famed orator: “Perhaps there’s 
actually someone inside who wants to become your pupil.  I notice some, in fact a good 
many, and they may well be embarrassed to question you.  So, while you’re being questioned 
by me, consider yourself being questioned by them as well…Try to answer them” (455c-d).  
Though Socrates may not “even discuss things with the majority” (474a-b) nor care whether 
or not they agree with him (482c), he apparently feels equipped to question on their behalf.  
Further, that he is willing to ask Gorgias questions that the audience would be otherwise 
embarassed to ask—interestingly, not afraid to ask—suggests that Socrates finds it possible 
that he and the audience—that is, Athenian political life more broadly—can share a common 
conception of ethical life.   
Euben suggests that much of the democratic force of the text’s dialogical structure is 
derived from its engagement with the reader.  It is democratic insofar as it unsettles elitist 
claims to privileged knowledge and invites us to formulate our own arguments much as 
Socrates and his interlocutors formulate their own.25  We see, however, that the dialogue 
itself contains an audience.  If Euben is right, the presence of an attentive audience 
witnessing either a rhetorical demonstration of oratory or a dialectical exchange of reasons is 
a source of power.  Indeed, both Gorgias and Polus cite the locus of an orator’s power in the 
                                                          
24
 Gorgias tellingly remarks that it would be his “shame ever after” if he were not willing to continue the 
discussion with Socrates (458d). 
 
25
 Interestingly, Euben invokes the language of care with respect to interpretation: “Such a shift [toward 
engaging the text] would, to begin with, turn our attention away from the historical Socrates and authoritarian 
Plato to the interplay between an evolving text and the generation of sometimes divided interpretative 
communities who care about and for them [emphasis added]” (226).  In this respect, Euben’s view of 
interpretation as engagement comports with my own notion of care in the Gorgias. 
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audience insofar as they are able to persuade others to agree with them.26 I argue that the 
presence of this audience provides an opportunity to extend Euben’s claim such that the same 
democratic argument can be made within the text itself.  In order to do so, it must be shown 
that Socrates can engage the audience in a way that promotes democracy. 
                                                          
26
 It is worth noting that the audience is active within the dialogue even though it is referred to only in the 
abstract as a group of men making a commotion (458c).  As Susan Bickford (1996) points out, listening is itself 
a form of active political participation.   
  
 
 
Socratic Elenchus and Democratic Engagement 
 This audience in the Gorgias plays several important roles that are overlooked in 
most commentaries on Plato’s early dialogues.  During the exchange with Gorgias, the crowd 
represents a slice of the Athenian demos most interested in acquiring rhetorical skill and the 
political influence it garners.  That is, they are would-be leaders who, if they are persuaded 
by the orators, threaten to corrupt the city.  As such, the audience is first established as the 
indirect target of Socrates’ civic care: persuading these particular members of the demos of 
Socrates’ thesis is especially important for constituting Socrates’ notion of a just political 
community.   
In the exchange with Polus, the audience is figured as a source of received wisdom: it 
is constituted by a shared conception of happiness (eudemonia) which suggests it is better to 
escape punishment than suffer it, and likewise with injustice.  Socrates’ discussion with 
Polus dramatizes how completely antithetical the latter’s worldview is from the former, and 
helps explain why Socrates’ elenchus with Polus is more aggressive.  Because Polus posits 
himself and the crowd as adherents to an inconsistent view of happiness which directly 
refutes Socrates, the philosopher must drag out the inconsistencies of their arguments in 
order to clear space for his reconstruction of the type of justice which should constitute the 
Athenian political community.   
Finally, during his exchange with Callicles, Socrates advances an argument favoring 
philosophy because it allows the individual to maintain a sense of self within the demos.  
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Unlike oratory, which stakes its truth-claims in mass appeal, philosophy encourages the 
individual to formulate independent, critical thought.  As noted earlier, Socrates and Callicles 
are similar insofar as they are deeply committed to their two loves: Socrates has Alcibiades 
and philosophy; Callicles has the Demos and demos.  The two thus represent countervailing 
notions of how one situates oneself in society.  For the former, this means engaging one’s 
community with a degree of critical distance necessary for effective political leadership.  The 
latter view lacks this critical distance, and is thus rendered unable to engage political life in 
difficult, sometimes disagreeable, discussion.  As Socrates observes of Callicles: “I 
notice…you’re unable to contradict your beloved, clever though you are, no matter what he 
says or what he claims is so.  You keep shifting back and forth” (481d).  On this account, 
Callicles and the oratorical model fail to provide a viable theory of democratic political 
leadership.  To return to the example with which I began this paper—between the senator and 
the citizen—it would have been easy for Specter to have indulged the crowd’s outrage.  
Following the oratorical model, such a disposition would likely have won the senator that 
crowd’s votes.  However, he would not have engaged them in the difficult disagreement he 
clearly thought they needed to have.  Perhaps more importantly, the citizens would not have 
risen to engage their representative.  Consequently, the exchange between the senator and the 
angry citizen, that “demonstration of democracy,” would not have taken place.  Thematizing 
the audience of the Gorgias thus allows my argument to reconnect to the debate between 
consensus theorists and difference democrats discussed earlier in the paper.  On my 
interpretation, Socrates is warning against a politics that focuses on finding common ground 
at the expense of attending to the cleavages that cut across a genuinely democratic political 
landscape.   
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Targeting the audience and democratically engaging it are, however, two different 
tasks.  Viable accounts of civic care—perhaps even the elenchus as a form of social 
interaction—must also demonstrate how the elenchus is more democratic than its rhetorical 
alternative.  Here, it is instructive to turn to Vlastos’ account of how the elenchus operates.  
Briefly summarized, Vlastos argues that the elenchus is a four-stage process: 
1. The interlocutor asserts a thesis, p, which Socrates considers false and seeks to refute. 
2. Socrates affirms agreement to further premises—q and r—which are not apparently 
connected to p.  Socrates argues from {q,r}, not to them. 
3. Socrates next argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q and r entail not-p 
4. Socrates finally claims that he has demonstrated that not-p is true, rendering p false. 
11 
If Vlastos’ account is correct, the elenchus suffers from at least two flaws.  First, the strength 
of the conclusion, not-p, is contingent upon the interlocutor’s assent to the validity of {q,r}, 
as well the disagreement between {q, r} and p.  Vlastos does not appear to recognize this 
problem.  Importantly, if Socrates can only extract qualified assent from his interlocutors 
(e.g. “If you say so” or “So it would seem” or “Apparently”) he will not likely extract 
unqualified assent (e.g. “Absolutely”) for the conclusion not-p.  This leads to the second 
problem, which Vlastos identifies as “the problem of the elenchus”: namely, that proving 
not-p does not necessarily disprove p (21).  Taken together, these problems may explain 
some of the reason that Callicles, like many of Socrates’ interlocutors, finds himself unable 
to respond to the philosopher, yet unconvinced of his thesis.   
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 Unlike Vlastos, I do not find a need to resolve these problems of elenchus, especially 
not as the model works as an example of civic care.  Rather, they make elenchus a more 
democratic procedure.  True, elenctic arguments do attempt to persuade interlocutors of 
positive theses; but, as noted earlier, the other goal of elenchus is to render supporting 
arguments logically consistent.  An elenchus has not failed simply because it fails to 
reconcile two contradictory viewpoints.  Rather, it has failed only if initial beliefs go 
unchallenged.  When citizens engage one another in elenctic dialectic, they must explore the 
logical ramifications of their beliefs, p, while examining whether or not their supporting 
reasons upon examination support p.  In order to engage in elenchus, they must first 
acknowledge that they are prepared to be refuted, and must further commit to truthfully 
following the logical consequences of their initial beliefs.  They must be willing to abandon 
their initial beliefs if these are revealed to be unsupportable; however, should they find 
themselves unconvinced, they must only be willing—as Socrates is—to continue the 
examination.  As such, the elenctic model is more democratic than its oratorical alternative 
insofar as it loosens the elitist grip of private knowledge upon which the latter is grounded.         
 As I argued in my interpretation of his exchanges with Gorgias and Polus, Socrates 
engages public reason by conducting his elenchus in a public forum.  Though he may not 
examine each audience member individually, he at least debases the orators’ elitist—
potentially tyrannical—claims to knowledge.  In so doing, he democratizes the examination 
of what we count as knowledge.  Rather than asymmetrically positing himself against the 
demos as a possessor of esoteric wisdom, he has given them the tools to conduct their own 
reasonable moral debates through elenchus.  Furthermore, the elenctic model posits radically 
different standards of success than oratory.  Whereas oratory defines political aretē in terms 
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of one’s ability to manipulate unknowledgeable groups of people, elenchus posits political 
aretē as one’s capacity for reasonable, sustained debate.   
The elenctic model is more democratic than oratory in at least two ways.  First, any 
reasonable person can adopt it.  Though some elenchi are more successful than others, one 
need not necessarily be as crafty as Socrates to sustain a successful elenchus with one’s 
peers.  (That Socrates fails to persuade his interlocutors of his thesis might actually cast 
doubt on how crafty he really is!)  Secondly, elenchus is not amenable to tyrannical 
cooptation.  By encouraging citizens to challenge one another’s beliefs on reasonable 
grounds, it at once empowers citizens to formulate independent beliefs and the wherewithal 
to assess them, all the while unsettling potentially dogmatic commonsense.27  Moreover, 
these skills comport with Socrates’ notion of politics as soul-care insofar as they will 
engender a culture of citizens who are constantly debating issues of public concern.  Such 
practices are good for individuals’ logoi and, by extension, the regime’s democratic quality.  
Finally, citizens who are accustomed to elenchus as a model of reasoning are better equipped 
to lead themselves.  Consequently, the pool of potential candidates for political leadership 
expands beyond Callicles’ house, so to speak, to a broader cross-section of the ever-changing 
demos.  This will, in turn, produce a more robust democracy. 
                                                          
27
  Interestingly, these are the same critical thinking skills Mill thought liberal societies should promote in “On 
Liberty,” and for very nearly the same reasons.   
  
 
 
Conclusion 
 I have argued throughout this paper that reasonable disagreements retain a special 
value for pluralistic democracies.  By engaging one another in such disagreements, citizens 
perform what I have called a practice of civic care.  This theory works as an intervention in 
the debate between democratic political theorists who argue, on the one hand, that 
disagreements between citizens should be mediated by some form of consensus and those 
who, on the other hand, promote pluralistic values of diversity and individual-oriented 
politics on the other.  The theory of civic care retains a commitment to reasoned 
argumentation found in the former, while seeking to articulate the political value of 
disagreement found in the latter.  As my interpretation of Plato’s Gorgias further 
demonstrates, citizens who exchange reasoned arguments for and against competing 
conceptions of justice—and its place in securing the conditions under which humans 
flourish—take responsibility for themselves, each other, and their broader political 
community.  In so doing, they sustain and revitalize the democratic ethos that characterizes 
their polity.  That is, in challenging each other, they care for themselves.    
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